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THE ROADBLOCK FOR GENERIC DRUGS: DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT JURISDICTION FOR LATER GENERIC CHALLENGERS

Matthew Avery & Mary Nguyen*
The Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drug manufacturers to
market a generic equivalent of a pharmaceutical company's
patented drug prior to the patent's expiration by bringing
ParagraphIV challenges against the patent holder. To encourage
generic manufacturers to make these challenges, the HatchWaxman Act grants the first generic challenger ('first-filer")for a
particulardrug a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity during
which the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") will not
approve applications from later generic challengers ("laterfilers"). However, the first-filer almost always enters into reversepayment settlement agreements with the pharmaceutical patent
holder, where the patent holder agrees to pay the generic
challenger to postpone entering the market. These settlement
agreements act as roadblocksfor later-filers.
One of the only ways for a later-filer to overcome such a
roadblock is to bring a declaratoryjudgment action against the
pharmaceuticalpatent holder. Early decisions by the Federal
Circuit, however, suggested that later-filers could not bring
declaratory judgment actions because they failed to satisfy the
Constitution'sArticle III "case or controversy" requirement.
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This Article analyzes current case law regarding declaratory
judgment jurisdictionfor later-filers,provides strategies that both
patent holders and generic challengers should consider before
bringing suit, andproposes several ways to balance the competing
interests of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
I. INTRODUCTION

Pharmaceutical innovations have transformed health care in the
United States. Consumers have turned to a variety of drug
therapies to help prevent, control, and treat their many ailments,
spending a total of $320 billion on prescription drugs in 2011.'
Eighty percent of these prescriptions were for generic drugs, which
are generally more affordable than brand-name drugs.2 However,
the declining use of brand-name drugs has arguably reduced the
incentive for innovators to create new drugs. The annual number
of new drugs approved for marketing has declined from a peak of
fifty-three in 1996 to only thirty-nine in 2012.4 Over the last
See The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2011, IMS INST.
2012), http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ims/
Global/Content/Insights/IMS%20Institute%20for%2OHealthcare%20Informatics
/IHII Medicines in U.SReport 201 1.pdf.
2 Id
3 See Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition May Warrant A Revision Of The Hatch- Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH
AFF. 2157 (2011), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/11/
2157.full.html.
4 See Matthew Arnold, FDA BLA Approvals Rose in 2009 While NMEs
Stumbled, MED. MKTG. & MEDIA (Dec. 31, 2009), http://www.mmmonline.com/fda-bla-approvals-rose-in-2009-while-nmesstumbled/article/160496/; Matthew Avery, PersonalizedMedicine and Rescuing
"Unsafe" Drugs with Pharmacogenomics:A Regulatory Perspective, 65 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 37, 38 (2010); Pills Get Smart: Potential Encapsulated,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.economist.com/
businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story id=15276730;
Anna
Edney
&
Catherine Larkin, Drug Approvals Reach 15-Year High on Smoother FDA
Reviews, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2013-01-02/drug-approvals-reach-15-year-high-on-smoother-fdareviews.html. However, the thirty-nine new drug approvals in 2012 was a
dramatic increase from the FDA's historical practice; from 2001 to 2010, the
FDA averaged just under twenty-three new drug approvals each year. See FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., Summary ofNDA Approvals and Receipts, 1938 to the Present
FOR HEALTH INFO. (Apr.
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decade, revenue generated by the introduction of new drugs has
failed to counterbalance the loss of sales revenue caused by generic
drug competition.' This competition is becoming more intensegeneric companies continue to file hundreds of applications each
year to market generic versions of brand-name drugs, with 853
such applications filed in 2011 alone.6 Compounding this problem
is a rapidly approaching "patent cliff," when numerous
pharmaceutical products are expected to lose patent protection.' In
2011, for example, brand-name drug spending declined by $14.9
billion due to expired patents.' In the past three years, more than
seventy drugs have gone off patent.9 By the year 2016, nine of the
top fifteen best-selling drugs in the world will lose patent
protection. o

(Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Product
Regulation/SummaryofNDAApprovalsReceiptsl938tothepresent/default.htm.
Grabowski et al., supra note 3, at 2160.
6 See Dave McCleary, eCTD ANDA Submission Statistics, CUSTOPHARM
BLOG (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.custopharm.com/blog/bid/73873/eCTDANDA-Submission-Statistics; see also Kwadwo Awuah, GPhA 2011:
Regulatory Recommendationsfor ANDAs, FDA (Oct. 4, 2011), http:// www.fda.
gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGe
nerics/UCM29265 1.pdf.
7See Christopher K. Hepp, Big Pharma Gearing up to Face the Patent Cliff,
PHILLY.COM (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.philly.com/inquirer/business/1
07412428.html; More Than 1,000 Drug Patents Expiring During the Next Two
Years: PharmaLive Special Reports, UBM CANON (Dec. 3, 2010), http://
www.mddionline.com/blog/devicetalk/more-1000-drug-patents-expiring-duringnext-two-years -pharmalive -special-reports.
8 See IMS INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., supra note 1.
9 See DAVID COLLINS & TROY SMITH, STRATEGY IN THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: MERCK & CO. AND PFIZER INC. 5
(HARV.

Bus. SCH. rev. 2007) (2006), available at http://magus9653.files.

wordpress.com/2008/1 1/harvard-business-review-strategy-in-the.pdf.
One
group reported that nine of the top ten best-selling drugs in the world will lose
patent protection by 2014. See Hepp, supra note 7.
1o See Tom Randall, Drugmakers Poised to Report Biggest Drop Since 2006
on

Record Patent Loss,

BLOOMBERG

(Apr.

15,

2011,

10:13

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-15/drugmakers-poised-to-reportbiggest-drop-since-2006-on-record-patent-loss.html.
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Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, competitors seeking to market
a generic version of a previously approved pharmaceutical product
must file and receive approval of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application ("ANDA")." By filing an ANDA, a competitor need
only demonstrate that its product is bioequivalent to a brand-name
drug, rather than conduct clinical trials on the efficacy or safety of
its products. 12 If the competitor also files a "Paragraph IV
Certification," asserting that each of the patents for the
pharmaceutical product is invalid and/or not infringed by the
competitor's product, then the competitor receives a 180-day
period of market exclusivity during which the FDA may not
approve ANDAs subsequently filed by other generic
manufacturers who filed Paragraph IV certifications for the same
patent.13 The 180-day exclusivity period typically allows the first
ANDA filer to capture 80% to 90% of the market, often within
months of entering the marketplace.14
In response to this intense generic competition, pharmaceutical
patent holders have used a variety of controversial means to extend
their patent-granted monopoly, many of which have been criticized
by both academics and the government." For example, pharmaceutical
" See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an
application . . . is effective with respect to such drug."); 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(l)355(j)(5)(A) (2006) ("Any person may file with the Secretary an abbreviated
application for the approval of a new drug . . . [and] the Secretary shall approve
or disapprove the application.").
12 See Grabowski et al., supra note 3, at 2157.
"3 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(a).
14 For example, the generic form of Prozac (fluoxetine) claimed approximately
65% of the market within a month of generic entry, 80% by the end of the first
generic competitor's 180-day exclusivity period, and leveled out at almost 90%
after a year of generic competition. See Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening to
Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFF. 210, 214
(2004), availableat http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/5/210.full.
15 See, e.g., Saami Zain, Sword or Shield? An Overview and Competitive
Analysis of the Marketing of "Authorized Generics," 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 739,
742 (2007) ("Recently, under the rubric of 'Lifecycle Management,' consultants
and pharmaceutical executives have been encouraging various actions to
squeeze the most profitability from existing drugs. Certain of these actions have
been criticized as unethical, anticompetitive or even fraudulent.") (footnote
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patent holders almost always enter into reverse-payment
settlements with the first generic drug manufacturer to file an
ANDA.16 A reverse-payment settlement is when the patent holder
agrees to make cash payments to the generic challenger in
exchange for the generic challenger agreeing to delay the launch of
its generic product." By carefully crafting these settlements, the
patent holder and the first ANDA filer are able to take advantage
of certain provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act to create a
roadblock based on the first-filer's 180-day exclusivity period,
which prevents other generic companies from entering the
market.

One of the only ways for later-filers to overcome such a
roadblock is to bring a declaratory judgment action against the
pharmaceutical patent holder to obtain a judgment that its patents
are invalid or not infringed. Early decisions by the Federal Circuit,
however, suggested that these later-filers could not bring
declaratory judgment actions because the later-filers could not
satisfy the Constitution's Article III "case or controversy"
requirement, which authorizes a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over a case only when there is an actual controversy
between the parties before the court.19
Recent Federal Circuit decisions have helped clear the path for
later-filers to bring declaratory judgment actions against
omitted); Matthew Avery, Note, ContinuingAbuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
PharmaceuticalPatent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 171, 179-83 (2008).
16See Avery, supra note 15, at 192-93.
'7 See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) ("Company A
sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms
that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented
product until the patent's term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay
B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay
the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement
agreement is often called a 'reverse payment' settlement agreement.").
Commentators refer to such settlements as "reverse payments" because they
involve payments from the plaintiff to the defendant-i.e., from the patentee to
the generic manufacturer. See James C. Burling, Hatch-Waxman Patent
Settlements: The Battlefor a Benchmark, 20 ANTITRUST 41, 41 (2006).
18 See Avery, supra note 15, at 191-93.
1Id. at l87 n.111.
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pharmaceutical patent holders. In two bookend decisions, Caraco
v. Forest20 and Janssen v. Apotex,2 1 the Federal Circuit stipulated
that a later-filer may bring a declaratory judgment action so long as
the first ANDA filer's 180-day exclusivity period is the only bar to
the later-filer's ability to enter the marketplace.22 Based on the
Caraco and Janssen decisions, district courts are now allowing
later-filers to bring declaratory judgment actions in order to force
first-filers to forfeit their 180-day exclusivity periods. Generally,
courts allow these actions to progress so long as the later-filer:
(1) has filed Paragraph IV certifications against every patent listed
in the FDA's Orange Book' for the challenged brand-name drug,
and; (2) has not independently stipulated to the validity of any of
these patents.
This Article reviews how declaratory judgment jurisdiction for
generic challengers has evolved over time, provides strategies for
both patent holders and later ANDA filers, and proposes modifying
the current regulatory regime to resolve problems with declaratory
judgment jurisdiction for later ANDA filers. Part II of this Article
provides a brief overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
Paragraph IV certification process. Part III discusses how the
Federal Circuit has reconciled the Constitution's Article III "case
or controversy" requirement with declaratory judgment actions,
allowing first ANDA filers to bring such actions against brandname drug manufacturers.
Part IV reviews Federal Circuit
decisions that have provided the framework for determining
whether later ANDA filers may bring these declaratory judgment
actions. Part V discusses recent district court decisions that have
followed this framework in determining declaratory judgment
jurisdiction for later ANDA filers. Part VI provides strategies that
both patent holders and later ANDA filers should consider before
bringing suit. Finally, Part VII proposes modifying the current
2o 527
21 540

F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22 Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1361; Caraco,527
F.3d at 1293-94.
23 The Orange Book lists drugs "approved on the
basis of safety and
effectiveness by the [FDA]."

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Approved Drugs with

Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) (Apr. 12, 2013), http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucml 29662.htm.
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regulatory regime to resolve problems with declaratory judgment
jurisdiction by:
(1) expressly granting declaratory judgment
jurisdiction to later ANDA filers; (2) reforming use of the 180-day
exclusivity period; or (3) making it easier for generic challengers
to get blocking patents delisted from the OrangeBook.24
II. FDA REGULATION OF GENERIC DRUGS

A. The Hatch-Waxman Act and ParagraphIV Certifications
The marketing of generic drugs is regulated in part by the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 25 Under Hatch-Waxman, before a generic
drug manufacturer can enter the market, it must seek FDA
approval by filing an ANDA. 26 A pharmaceutical company must
list all patents that claim its brand-name drug in the FDA's socalled Orange Book.27 As part of the ANDA, the generic applicant
is required to make one of the following certifications regarding
each patent listed in the Orange Book that claims the drug it seeks
to copy: (I) that the drug is not patented or that patent information
has not been filed; (II) that the patent has expired; (III) that the
generic drug will not enter the market until the patent expires; or
24 It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze whether later generic
challengers can use inter partes review as an alternative to a declaratory
judgment action for triggering forfeiture of a first-filer's 180-day exclusivity
period. Because interpartes review is still a new process, it is unclear whether
patent nullification by the Patent Trial and Appeals Board in an inter partes
review proceeding would qualify to trigger forfeiture. See Kurt R. Karst, Inter
Partes Review and Forfeiture of 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, FDA LAW
BLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda law blog
hymanphelps/2013/02/inter-partes-review-and-forfeiture-of- 180-day-genericdrug-exclusivity.html.
25 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006),
35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e) (2006)).
26 See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16 (1984).
27 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006). The OrangeBook is the common
name
for the FDA publication Approved Drug Productswith TherapeuticEquivalence
Evaluations, which is published monthly. OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN.,
EVALUATIONS

APPROVED DRUG PROD. WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE

(2008) [hereinafter Orange Book], available at http://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm.
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(IV) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug for which the
application is submitted." These are called Paragraph 1, 11, 111, and
IV certifications, respectively.
By making a Paragraph IV certification, a generic
manufacturer can seek FDA approval to market a generic
equivalent of a pioneer's patented drug before the patent term has
expired.29 Subsection 271(e) of the Patent Act, however, provides
that making a Paragraph IV certification alone is an act of patent
infringement.3 0 Consequently, the mere filing of an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification allows the pioneer to sue the generic
challenger for infringing its patents listed in the Orange Book.
As an incentive for generic drug manufacturers to risk ANDA
litigation, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day exclusivity
period to the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA
containing a Paragraph IV certification for a particular drug." The
FDA is forbidden from approving later-filed ANDAs for the same
drug until 180 days after the first-filer begins commercially
marketing a generic equivalent of the drug.32 This 180-day period
is not triggered until the first-filer enters the marketplace." Using
this provision to their advantage, pharmaceutical patent holders
often enter into so-called reverse-payment settlements where the
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
Consequently, patent challenges pursuant to Paragraph IV are a frequently
deployed mechanism for the early introduction of generic competition. See FED.
TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 10 (2002) (reporting challenges involving 130 drugs between 1984
and 2000); Examining the Senate and House Versions of the "GreaterAccess to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act": Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 113, 117 (2003) (statement of Timothy Muris,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (noting challenges involving more than
eiqhty drugs between January 2001 and June 2003).
o 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012) ("It shall be an act of infringement to
submit . . . an [ANDA] for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is
28
29

claimed in a patent. . . .").
31 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012) (providing that until the 180-day
exclusivity period has run, the FDA may not approve any successive ANDA
applications on the same patent).

32 See id.
33 See id. at

(1).
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pharmaceutical patent holder pays the first-filer and the first-filer
agrees to delay marketing its generic equivalent until a later date
(often until right before the patent expires). 34 If the first-filer never
enters the market under reverse payment settlements, the 180-day
exclusivity period is not triggered; generic entry, therefore,
becomes bottlenecked because the FDA cannot approve later-filed
ANDAs." One of the only ways this roadblock can be broken is if
the first-filer forfeits the 180-day exclusivity. 6 Furthermore, one
of the few ways for a later-filer to cause forfeiture by the first-filer
is by securing a Federal Circuit holding.that the pioneer's patent is
either invalid or not infringed."
When later-filers bring Paragraph IV ANDA challenges,
pharmaceutical patent holders often choose not to sue the laterfilers for patent infringement, thereby avoiding a possible finding
of invalidity or non-infringement. In response, later-filers have
brought declaratory judgment actions to obtain a judgment that the
patents at issue are invalid or have not been infringed."

34 See Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of
Pioneerand Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 74 (2003);

Avery, supra note 15, at 181. The Supreme Court recently held that reversepayment settlement agreements may be antitrust violations subject to a "rule of
reason" analysis. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, No. 12-416, slip op. at 3, 13
(S. Ct. June 17, 2013). The Court rejected both the traditional scope-of-the
patent test, which made most reverse-payment settlement agreements
presumptively lawful, and the FTC's proposal to make such settlements
presumptively unlawful. Id. at 13. Instead, the Court took the middle ground
and held that courts reviewing such agreements should apply the rule-of-reason
analysis but left it to the lower courts to figure out what types of settlements
would actually be antitrust violations. Id. at 13-14.
3 See Soehnge, supra note 34, at 74; Avery, supra note 15, at 181.
36 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (effective Dec. 8, 2003) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Medicare
Modernization Act or "MMA"]; Avery, supra note 15, at 185.
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA)
(2012); Avery, supra note 15, at
191-92.
38 See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
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B. The Roadblock of the Failure-to-MarketForfeitureProvision
Because the FDA cannot approve any later-filed ANDAs until
the exclusivity period expires, reverse-payment settlements
effectively create a barrier that stops all generic manufacturers
from bringing a generic version of the drug to market until the
brand-name company's patent expires. However, the HatchWaxman Act provides that the exclusivity period is forfeited if the
first applicant does not enter the market in a timely manner." The
forfeiture provisions state that the first-filer's 180-day exclusivity
is lost if, among other things, there is a "failure to market" event.4 0
The Act defines "failure to market" as follows:
(1) FAILURE TO MARKET. The first applicant fails to market the
drug by the later of-(aa) the earlierof the date that is-(AA) 75 days after the date on which the [application of the first
applicant is approved]; or
(BB) 30 months after the date of submission of the application of
the first applicant; or
(bb) with respect to the first applicant or any other applicant (which
other applicant has received tentative approval), the date that is 75 days
after the date as of which ... at least I of the following has occurred:
(AA) In an infringement action ... or in a declaratory judgment
action . .. [the Federal Circuit finds on appeal] that the patent is

invalid or not infringed.
(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment
action . . . a court signs a settlement order or consent decree that
enters a final judgment that includes a finding that the patent is
invalidor not infringed.
(CC) [The patent holder delists the patent from the Orange
Book]. 41

But this "failure to market" provision is almost never triggered
because all elements of the complicated "earlier of'/"later of'
provisions are not satisfied by the typical reverse-payment
settlement. In order to trigger a failure to market forfeiture, an
event in both subparts (aa) and (bb) must occur. 42 However, the
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa)(AA).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)-(ii).
41 Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (emphasis added).
42 Avery, supra note 15, at 192.
'

40
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typical reverse-payment settlement is crafted to ensure that an
event in subpart (bb) never occurs. 4 3 More specifically, these
settlements do not include a finding that the pioneer's patent is
invalid or not infringed, as required by event (bb)(BB).44 Consequently,
the only practical way a later-filing applicant can trigger the
failure-to-market provision is by satisfying event (bb)(AA), that is,
by bringing a declaratory judgment action against the patent holder
to demonstrate that each of the pioneer's patents for a given drug is
invalid or not infringed.45
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AND THE ARTICLE III
CASE-OR-CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT

A. DeclaratoryJudgment Actions Generally
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to "cases" and "controversies." 46 Under the Case or
Controversy Clause, a court may only render an opinion when
there is a party before the court who has suffered actual ihjury that
is traceable to the defendant, and where the injury can be redressed
by the court.4 7 In the case of declaratory judgment actions, where a
party is merely asking the court to state the legal effect of proposed
conduct, the court may only issue an opinion when a specific,
concrete controversy exists between the parties. This is codified in
the Declaratory Judgment Act ("Act"), which provides that:
[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought.4 8

43

See id. at 191.
See id. at 192.
45 Note that the (bb)(AA) event is only triggered if the generic challenger can
show that all of the patents listed in its Paragraph IV certification are either
invalid or not infringed.
46 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
47 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
48 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)
(2012).
4
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In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,4 9 the Supreme Court
held that for there to be an "actual controversy" under the Act, the
case must: (1) be "appropriate for judicial determination" in the
constitutional sense; (2) be "definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests;" and (3)
have "real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character.""o In other words, the
Court held that federal courts may issue a declaratory judgment if
the plaintiff shows that the defendant caused an actual or imminent
injury that can be resolved by a favorable decision by the court.
B. The Federal Circuit's Application of the Case-or-Controversy
Requirement
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Aetna, the Federal
Circuit historically applied a reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test
to determine whether or not a plaintiff presented a case or
controversy in declaratory judgment actions." The reasonableapprehension-of-suit test required: (1) that the patent holder made
an explicit threat or took some other action that created a
reasonable apprehension that it would sue the declaratory judgment
plaintiff; and (2) that the declaratory judgment plaintiff is currently
acting in an manner that could constitute infringement, or intends
to conduct such activity and has taken concrete steps towards
conducting such activity.52 Under this test, the Federal Circuit did
not allow declaratory judgment actions by plaintiffs who had been

300 U.S. 227 (1937).
Id. at 240-41 (citations omitted) ("Where there is such a concrete case
admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the
parties in an adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function
may be appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the
litigants may not require the award of process or the payment of damages.").
51 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2005), abrogatedby MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Note, however, that in Aetna the Court gave the lower courts discretion in
deciding whether they will claim jurisdiction over a particular case, even when
an "actual controversy" is deemed to exist.
52 See id. (citing Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
49

5o
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granted covenants not to sue or were not immediately threatened
with suit.
In Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.," the Federal

Circuit held that Teva could not bring a declaratory judgment
action challenging Pfizer's patent because it failed to meet the
"case or controversy" requirement under the reasonableapprehension-of-suit test. " Pfizer held the '518 and the '699
patents, which covered the drug Zoloft (sertraline hydrochloride).
In 1999, Ivax Pharmaceuticals filed the first ANDA seeking to
manufacture a generic version of Zoloft.16 Ivax's ANDA contained
a Paragraph IV certification for the '699 patent, stating that patent
was invalid or not infringed by Ivax's product." However, Ivax
only made a Paragraph III certification with respect to the '518
patent, stating that it would not market a generic version of Zoloft
until after the expiration of the '518 patent. Pfizer responded to
the Paragraph IV certification by suing Ivax for infringing the '699
patent. 59 Eventually, Pfizer entered into a reverse-payment
settlement with Ivax, where it agreed to pay Ivax a royalty, and in
return, Ivax agreed not to enter the market with its generic version
of Zoloft until the '518 patent expired in June 2006.60 Because
Ivax was the first ANDA filer for Zoloft, it was entitled to a 180day generic market exclusivity period. 61 Furthermore, because
Ivax agreed in the settlement not to launch its generic drug until
the '518 patent expired, other generic challengers would be barred
from marketing their generic versions of Zoloft until at least six
months after the expiry of the '518 patent.62
5
395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Medlmmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
54
Id. at 1338.
5
1Id. at 1326, 1329.
56
Id. at 1330.

57

d.

58 Id.

59 Id.
60
d

Id. ("As the first-filer of an ANDA for the generic version of Zoloft@, Ivax
is entitled, under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), to a 180-day generic market
exclusivity period.").
61

62 id
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Three years after Ivax filed the first ANDA challenging Zoloft,
Teva filed a similar ANDA seeking approval to manufacture its
own version of Zoloft. 63 Teva also made a Paragraph III
certification against the '518 patent and a Paragraph IV
certification against the '699 patent.' Rather than suing Teva for
filing a Paragraph IV certification, Pfizer chose to ignore Teva's
challenge. 6 5 Because of Ivax's 180-day exclusivity period, the
FDA was barred from approving Teva's later-filed ANDA until the
exclusivity period expired. 66 Because of the reverse-payment
settlement between Ivax and Pfizer, the exclusivity period would
not run until six months after the June 2006 expiry date of the '518
patent.6 7 In order to break this roadblock, Teva filed a declaratory
judgment action against Pfizer seeking a determination that the
'699 patent was either invalid or not infringed.6 8 Pfizer moved to
dismiss the action on the grounds that there was no actual
controversy.6
Both the trial court and the appellate court applied the
reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test and held that Teva did not
have standing to bring the declaratory judgment action because
there was no actual controversy with Pfizer. 0 Although Teva
actually infringed the '699 patent with its Paragraph IV
certification, thus satisfying the second prong of the reasonableapprehension-of-suit test, Teva failed to satisfy the first prong of
the test because Pfizer had not taken actions indicating that it
would sue Teva for infringing the '699 patent.7 ' Thus, the Federal
Circuit dismissed Teva's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
holding that Teva had failed to establish that an actual controversy
existed with Pfizer.72
id.

63

6

65

Id. at 1326.

1 d. at

66

Id. at
67 Id at
61 Id at
69 Id at
7o Id at
7'

72

1330.
1334.
1330.
1327.
1330.

1332.

Id. at 1334.

Id at 1338.
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In Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.," the Supreme Court

lowered the requirements for meeting the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement and explicitly criticized the Federal
Circuit's use of the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test.7 4 In this
case, MedImmune brought a declaratory judgment action
challenging the validity of a patent that it had already licensed."
MedImmune had previously agreed to the license agreement under
threat of suit, but believed the patent to be invalid or not
infringed. 76 Rather than simply refusing to pay the license
agreement and face legal action, MedImmune agreed to pay the
license but brought a declaratory judgment action challenging
Genentech's patent." Applying the two-prong test from Teva v.
Pfizer, the District Court and the Federal Circuit dismissed
Medlmmune's suit, holding that MedImmune failed the case-orcontroversy requirement because, at the time of suit, the license
agreement eliminated any reasonable apprehension that Genentech
would sue for infringement.
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
two-prong test and re-affirmed that the Declaratory Judgment
Act's "actual controversy" requirement is the same as Article III's
"case or controversy" requirement.79 Thus, a case or controversy
exists in declaratory judgment actions when "the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.""o

7 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
74
Id. at 132 n.1 1 ("Even if Altvater could be distinguished as an 'injunction'
case, it would still contradict the Federal Circuit's 'reasonable apprehension of
suit' test (or, in its evolved form, the 'reasonable apprehension of imminent suit'
test, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. PfizerInc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (2005)).").
75
Id. at 121-22.
76
7

d.

1d. at 122.

78 Id. Essentially, the Federal Circuit required that the plaintiff break the
license agreement before bringing a declaratory judgment action. Id.
7
1Id.
at 127-28, 132 n.11.
80
Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
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Under the "all circumstances test," the Court reasoned that
although MedImmune's payment of the royalties eliminated the
risk that the licensor would sue, it did not eliminate Medlmmune's
Article III jurisdiction because of the coercive nature of the
licensor's demand; the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to
ameliorate such situations. " Therefore, the Court held that
Medlmmune was not required to breach the license agreement
before seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed.82
C. First ANDA Filers Generally Have Standing in Declaratory
Judgment Actions
Initially, the Federal Circuit held that all ANDA applicantsboth first-filers and later-filers-failed to satisfy the Constitution's
Article III "case or controversy" requirement." However, after the
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Medlmmune v. Genentech, the
Federal Circuit revised its position.
In Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Corp.,84 the Federal Circuit found that its prior decisions conflicted
with MedImmune and held that a first ANDA filer could bring a
declaratory judgment action against the patent holder, even though
the filer recited multiple patents in a single ANDA and was later
sued by the patent holder on only one of those patents." Novartis
listed five patents in the FDA's Orange Book.86 Teva was the first
ANDA applicant to certify under Paragraph IV that its drug either
did not infringe any of Novartis's five patents or that Novartis's

" Id.
82

at 129, 131.

Id. at 137.

See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2005). The Federal Circuit's decision in Teva was surprising considering
Congress explicitly granted ANDA applicants declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i) (2013); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2010).
8 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
85 Id. at 1334, 1346 (holding that the first ANDA
filer could bring a
declaratory judgment action against the patent holder where the patent holder
responded to a Paragraph IV ANDA by only suing the first-filer for infringing
one of five patents listed in the Orange Book).
86
Id. at 1334.
83
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patents were invalid.17 Within forty-five days of receiving notice
of Teva's Paragraph IV certification, Novartis sued Teva for
infringing its '937 patent but not the other four patents. 88 In
response, Teva brought an action against Novartis seeking a
declaration that its drug did not infringe Novartis's remaining four
method patents.89 The district court dismissed Teva's declaratory
judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds
that Teva had no reasonable apprehension of suit on the remaining
four patents, but the Federal Circuit reversed its decision. 9
Applying the Supreme Court's "all circumstances" test from
Medlmmune, the Federal Circuit held that although Novartis
neither filed suit nor threatened to sue Teva on the method patents,
Novartis created an actual controversy by suing Teva for
infringement of the '937 patent while retaining the right to sue
Teva under the remaining patents.9 1 The court did note, however,
that:
[T]he only circumstance in which a case or controversy might not exist
would arise in the rare circumstance in which the patent owner and
brand name drug company have given the generic applicant a covenant
not to sue, or otherwise formally acknowledge that the generic
92
applicant's drug does not infringe.

IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT JURISDICTION FOR LATER
ANDA FILERS
Teva v. Novartis made it clear that the first Paragraph IV
ANDA filer essentially can always bring a declaratory judgment

89

Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1335.
id

90 Id.

91 Id. at 1340-41. The court found that the following circumstances, taken as
a whole, were sufficient to create an actual controversy and establish declaratory
judgment jurisdiction: (1) Novartis listed its patents in the Orange Book; (2)
Teva submitted an ANDA certifying that it did not infringe Novartis' patents or
that the patents were invalid; (3) statutory provisions permitted an ANDA
applicant to file declaratory judgment action to obtain patent certainty in federal
court; (4) Novartis sued Teva for infringement of the '937 patent; and (5)
Novartis created the possibility of future litigation by retaining the right to sue
Teva under the remaining patents. Id.
" Id. at 1343.
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action against the pioneer, although the court's dicta suggests that
jurisdiction can be defeated by simply granting a covenant not to
sue to the generic challenger.9 3 Whether courts have jurisdiction to
hear declaratory judgment actions brought by later-filers, however,
is still in dispute. Subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit
suggest that declaratory judgment actions brought by later-filing
ANDA applicants may still fail the "case or controversy"
requirement, effectively eliminating the only pathway for laterfilers to break the exclusivity roadblock created by the first-filer's
reverse-payment settlement.94 In other cases, however, the Federal
Circuit has allowed later-filers to bring declaratory judgment
actions against pharmaceutical patent holders. These cases, which
are discussed herein, show that it is not at all clear if and when
later-filers can bring such actions.
A. Caraco v. Forest: Blocking Patents Create Sufficient "Case or
Controversy"
In Caraco, the Federal Circuit held that an Article III
controversy existed even though the patent holder had granted the
later ANDA filer a covenant not to sue because the patent holder's
mere listing of patents in the Orange Book created an injury-in-fact
that prevented the later-filer from entering the marketplace. "
Forest Laboratories held the '712 and '941 patents, which were
listed in the Orange Book as covering Lexapro (escitalopram), a
drug used to treat depression.96 Ivax Pharmaceuticals filed the first
ANDA application for Lexapro, which included Paragraph IV
9

See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.

94 See Janssen Pharm. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Merck

& Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 287 F. App'x 884 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
9 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1292 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (stating that under the "all circumstances" test set forth in
MedImmune, the defendant's mere listing of the patents in the Orange Book was
the but-for causation of the plaintiffs inability to enter the marketplace and thus
sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy). Because the first ANDA
filer in Caraco had filed its Paragraph IV certifications before the amendments
to the Hatch-Waxman Act set forth in the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA)
took effect, the MMA amendments to the 180-day triggers were inapplicable to
this case. Id. at 1283-84 n.2.
96
Id. at 1286.
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certifications against both patents. 97 Therefore, it was entitled to
180 days of generic marketing exclusivity, which could be
triggered by marketing its drug or by a judgment that both the '712
and '941 patents were invalid or not infringed. 98 Forest sued Ivax
for infringement of only the '712 patent and won." However,
Forest did not sue Ivax for infringing the '941 patent, likely in
order to insulate itself from a possible invalidity/non-infringement
judgment."'o As a result, Ivax failed to obtain a court judgment that
both the '712 and '941 patents were invalid or not infringed, which
was needed to trigger its 180-day exclusivity period.'"' Ivax was
thus excluded from entering the marketplace until the '712 patent

expired in 2012.102
Subsequently, Caraco Pharmaceutical Labs filed a Paragraph
IV ANDA challenging both the '712 and '941 patents. '03
However, Forest sued Caraco for infringement of only the '712
patent, '" which expired in 2012. ' Caraco then brought a
declaratory judgment action against Forest seeking a judgment of
non-infringement with respect to the '941 patent, which would not
expire until 2023."o6 Because Ivax still held the 180-day exclusivity
period, the FDA could not approve Caraco's ANDA until after the
exclusivity period ran or was forfeited. Thus, Caraco needed to
trigger the failure to market forfeiture event by getting a court
decision that the '941 patent was either invalid or not infringed. In
an apparent attempt to avoid this, Forest granted Caraco a
unilateral covenant not to sue on the '941 patent.'0 7 Forest then
9 Id.
9 Id.

99

Id
d. The '941 patent was not set to expire until 2023. Id.
'0' Id. at 1286-87.
102 Id. at 1287.
103 Id. at 1288. Forest probably chose to assert only the
earlier-expiring '712
patent because, even if the '712 patent was found invalid or not infringed by the
court, the ANDA filer would still not be able to safely enter the market without
risking patent infringement until the expiry of the '941 patent in 2023.
4Id.
os Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1288.
'07Id. at 1289.
00
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moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment action on the grounds
that, because of the covenant not to sue, Caraco had no fear of suit
The Federal Circuit
and therefore lacked a case or controversy.'
disagreed, stating that although Caraco had no reasonable
apprehension of suit as a result of the covenant not to sue, Caraco
had alleged a cognizable injury in fact-the inability to enter the
marketplace. '9

In determining that Caraco had standing, the Federal Circuit
stated that there were three requirements: (1) "there must be
alleged (and ultimately proved) an 'injury in fact'-a harm
suffered by the plaintiff that is 'concrete' and actual or imminent,
not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical;' " (2) "there must be causation-a
fairly traceable connection between the plaintiffs injury and the
complained-of conduct of the defendant;" and (3) "there must be
redressability-a likelihood that the requested relief will redress
the alleged injury.""o The court ultimately concluded that there
was an injury-in-fact because Caraco was being restrained from
selling its generic version of Lexapro."' Even though Forest had
granted Caraco a covenant not to sue on the '941 patent, Caraco
was still prevented from entering the marketplace due to the FDA's
inability to approve its ANDA.11 2 The court further stated that this
injury was caused by Forest because it was directly traceable to its
listing of the '941 patent in the Orange Book."3 Finally, the court
held that Caraco's injury-in-fact was redressable by a declaratory
oId. at 1288.
19 Id. at 1291.
0
Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03
(1998)).
11 Id. at 1292 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Specifically, the court stated that "[i]f [the applicant] is
correct that its generic drug does not infringe [the patent holder's] [asserted]
patent, then it has a right to enter the generic drug market, and its exclusion from
the generic drug market by [the patent holder's] actions is a sufficient Article III
injury-in-fact." Id.
112id

" Id. at 1292-93 ("Forest's listing of the '712 and '941 patents in the
Orange-Book effectively denies Caraco an economic opportunity to enter the
marketplace unless Caraco can obtain a judgment that both those patents are
invalid or not infringed by its generic drug.").
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judgment that the '941 patent was not infringed, which would
cause Ivax to forfeit its exclusivity period and allow the FDA to
approve Caraco's drug for marketing.114 Thus, the court held that
Caraco had presented an Article III case or controversy and
allowed the declaratory judgment action to proceed."'
B. Janssen v. Apotex: The 180-day Exclusivity Bottleneck is Not a
Sufficient Injury
In Janssen, the Federal Circuit found that an Article III case or
controversy did not exist between a patent holder and a later-filer
where the later-filer had stipulated to the validity, enforceability,
and infringement of one of the patents listed in the Orange Book."6
Janssen Pharmaceuticals listed three patents in the Orange Book as
covering its drug Risperdal (risperidone), which is used to treat
schizophrenia and bipolar mania."' In 2002, Teva Pharmaceuticals,
the first generic challenger, filed an ANDA with a Paragraph IV
certification directed to just two of the patents, the '425 and '587

Id. at 1293 ("A favorable judgment in this case would clear the path to
FDA approval that Forest's actions would otherwise deny Caraco-namely,
using the court-judgment trigger of [§ 355] to activate [the first ANDA filer's]
exclusivity period."). The Court also held that the patent holder's grant of a
covenant not to sue did not render the declaratory judgment action moot because
the covenant not to sue did not alleviate the harm of not being able to enter the
generic drug market. Id at 1297.
"s Id. at 1297. Eventually, the parties stipulated to an order dismissing the
case. Stipulation and Order, No. 2:09-CV-10274 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2009).
116 Janssen Pharm., N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2008); see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 287 F. App'x 884, 885-88
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (indicating that Apotex filed an ANDA seeking FDA approval
of a generic version of Fosamax). In response to a declaratory judgment action
by Apotex, Merck granted Apotex a covenant not to sue for infringement and
moved to dismiss all claims and counterclaims for lack of Article III
jurisdiction. Id. The district court granted Merck's motion, however, on appeal
the Federal Circuit dismissed the case as moot. Id. While the appeal was
pending, the first ANDA filer triggered its 180-day exclusivity period by
marketing its generic version of Fosamax. Id. Consequently, a declaratory
judgment would no longer allow Apotex to market its drug any sooner. Id.
" Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1357; see also About RISPERDAL CONSTA
http://www.risperdalconsta.com/about(risperidone), JANSSEN PHARM.,
risperdal-consta (last updated May 8, 2013, 5:41 PM).
114
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patents. "8 As for the third patent, the '663 patent, the ANDA
included a Paragraph III certification stating that Teva would not
launch its generic drug until the patent expired in June 2008."'
Thus, Teva's 180-day exclusivity period could not begin until after
the '663 patent expired in June 2008.
In 2006, Apotex subsequently filed an ANDA with Paragraph
IV certifications against all three patents in an attempt to trigger
forfeiture of Teva's exclusivity period. 120 In response, Janssen
sued Apotex for infringing only the '663 patent.12' Apotex filed a
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement
with respect to the '425 and '587 patents because the FDA could
not approve its drug for marketing unless all three patents were
found invalid or not infringed.12 2 In an apparent attempt to avoid
litigating the '425 and '587 patents, Janssen then unilaterally
granted Apotex a covenant not to sue with respect to these two
patents.123 After this covenant was granted, Apotex stipulated that
the '663 patent was valid, enforceable, and infringed because it had
agreed to be bound by the result of a separate litigation.124
Janssen moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment action on
the grounds that there was no Article III case or controversy.125
Apotex contested this and argued that an Article III case or
controversy existed for three reasons. First, Apotex argued that it
"8 Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1358. The first ANDA applicant filed a Paragraph III
declaration to the '663 patent because that patent had previously been found
valid and enforceable by the Federal Circuit in previous litigation. Id.
l9 Id. The '663 patent expired in December 2007, but the effective expiration
date of the '663 patent was in June 2008 because the FDA granted an additional
six months of pediatric exclusivity. Id. at 1357.
120 Id. at 1358.
Apotex's ANDA initially contained Paragraph IV
certifications on only the '425 and '587 patents, but later amended its ANDA to
include a Paragraph IV certification on the'663 patent in January 2006. Id.
121 id.
122 Id.
123 id
124 Id Although Apotex was not a party, it had agreed to be bound by
the
the
infringement,
Circuit
regarding
the
Federal
another
case
before
result of
validity, and enforceability of the '663 patent. Id. (citing Janssen Pharm., N.V.
v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 644, 671 (D.N.J. 2006), aff'd, 223 F.
App'x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
125 Id. at 1359.
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could not promptly launch its generic drug once the '663 patent
expired, but the Federal Circuit found that Apotex's injury of not
being able to enter the marketplace was not directly traceable to
Janssen's actions or redressable by the declaratory judgment
action. 126 Instead, Apotex's injury arose from the first ANDA
applicant's 180-day exclusivity period.127 According to the court,
"Apotex's inability to promptly launch its generic risperidone
product because of [the first applicant's] 180-day exclusivity
period is not a cognizable Article III controversy, but a result
envisioned by the Hatch-Waxman Act." 28 Even if Apotex were to
prevail on its declaratory judgment action, it would still be
prevented from entering the marketplace until the expiration of the
'663 patent because Apotex previously stipulated to its validity and
enforceability.129 Second, Apotex argued that the first ANDA filer
could indefinitely delay approval of Apotex's generic drug by not
marketing its drug.'30 However, the court found this alleged harm
was too speculative because there was no evidence that the first
ANDA filer would actually delay marketing of its generic drug."'
Finally, Apotex argued that the covenant not to sue did not protect
its affiliates, suppliers, and downstream customers, but the court
found that the covenant not to sue contained language that
expressly covered all suppliers and affiliates involved in the
manufacturing process and all customers. 3 2 Having rejected all of
Apotex's arguments, the court held that this later ANDA filer did
not satisfy the case or controversy requirement.13

26

Id. at 1359-60.
Id. at 1360.
28
1 Id. at 1361.
29
1 Id. The Court noted that if Apotex had not stipulated to the validity of the
'663 patent then the Caraco decision would have been controlling and Apotex
would have been able to bring the declaratory judgment actions. Id.
sold. at 1362.
131 Id. at 1363.
132 ida
1

27

1

133

Id. at 1363-64.
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C. Teva v. Eisai: Covenants Not to Sue Do Not Remove Article III
"Case or Controversy"
In Caraco v. Forest and Janssen v. Apotex, the Federal Circuit
set forth the framework for determining when the Article III "case
or controversy" requirement was satisfied. This framework was
reaffirmed in the now moot Teva v. Eisai decision.'34 In Teva, the
Federal Circuit reaffirmed the holdings of Caraco and Janssen,
finding that a later-filing ANDA applicant satisfied the case-orcontroversy requirement even though the patentee had granted
covenants not to sue to the generic challenger and secured a
preliminary injunction to bar it from entering the market. '
Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated the case as moot, but
Teva may still provide guidance on how the Federal Circuit will
decide challenges to declaratory judgment jurisdiction in the
future.'
Eisai manufactured the brand-name drug Aricept (donepezil
hydrochloride), which is used to treat Alzheimer's disease.' The
Orange Book listed five patents as covering Aricept: the '321,
'760, '841, '864, and '911 patents.'13 In 2003, Ranbaxy filed the
first ANDA for a generic form of Aricept.' 39 Ranbaxy's ANDA
contained a Paragraph III certification for the '841 patent, thereby
agreeing not to market its generic drug until after the '841 patent
expired in November 2010.140 The ANDA also contained Paragraph
IV certifications for the remaining four patents. 141 Because
Ranbaxy was the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer, it secured the
180-day exclusivity period, which would begin, at the earliest,

134 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., v. Eisai Med. Research, Inc., 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
3
Id. at 1347.
136 Even though it was vacated as moot, Teva serves as a valuable tool for
understanding the Federal Circuit's thinking in harmonizing the rules set forth in
Caracoand Janssen.
137 Teva, 620 F.3d at 1343.
13 Id
'3 1 Id. at 1344.
140

id

141

id
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when it entered the market after the expiry of the '841 patent. 142
In 2005 and 2007, Teva filed two separate ANDAs with
Paragraph IV certifications against all five of the Eisai's Orange
Book-listed patents for Aricept.143 Eisai responded by suing Teva
only for infringing its '841 patent, and the district court awarded
Eisai a preliminary injunction that prevented Teva from marketing
any drug covered by the '841 patent.'" Nevertheless, Teva filed a
declaratory judgment action for non-infringement with respect to
the remaining four patents. 14' Because Ranbaxy's exclusivity
period was blocking the FDA from approving Teva's later-filed
ANDA, Teva sought to trigger the failure-to-market forfeiture
event by obtaining a declaratory judgment that the remaining four
patents were either invalid or not infringed.'46 In order to avoid
this, Eisai moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that
Teva failed to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement.'4 7 Eisai
subsequently granted Teva a covenant not to sue covering the '911
and '760 patents.148 Eisai had previously filed statutory disclaimers
for the other two patents, the '321 and '864 patents, in 2006 and
2007 respectively. 49 The statutory disclaimers effectively cancelled the
patent claims, preventing them from being reissued or enforced,
but did not remove the patents from the Orange Book.'
The Federal Circuit held that Teva had satisfied the case-orcontroversy requirement, notwithstanding Eisai's preliminary
142 id.
143 id
'44Id.

at 1345. A separate litigation dealing with just the '841 patent was
pending while this case covering the remaining four patents was being heard.
See Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-5727/07-5489,
2008 WL 1722098, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008). In the litigation over the
'841 patent, the parties agreed that the preliminary injunction would remain in
effect until the '841 patent expired in November 2010. Teva, 620 F.3d at 1348
n.4.
145 Teva, 620 F.3d at 1345.
46 Id.
147 id
148 id

149

[d

Id. (quoting Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996))
("A
statutory disclaimer has the effect of cancelling the patent claims, meaning they
cannot be reissued or subsequently enforced.").
15o
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injunction, statutory disclaimers, and covenants not to sue."' The
court reasoned that here, like in Caraco, the very listing of the
patents in the Orange Book prevented Teva from entering the
marketplace.' 5 2 in contrast to Janssen, here the preliminary injunction
against Teva was not a final judgment and would not necessarily
prevent Teva from entering the marketplace before the expiration
of the '841 patent unless it matured into a permanent injunction.'5 3
The court also held that the disclaimers and covenants not to sue
did not eliminate Teva's case or controversy because all four
patents remained listed in the Orange Book, creating a "but-for"
scenario, where but for the Orange Book listings, Teva would be
able to launch its generic product. 5 4 Because Teva suffered an injury
that could not be redressed without a court judgment of invalidity
or non-infringement the court held that Teva had satisfied the caseor-controversy requirement.'
Eisai filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court."' The Court granted the petition, but vacated the case as
moot when Ranbaxy, the first ANDA applicant, entered the

's'
152

Id. at 1347.

Id. at 1347 n.3.
Id. at 1347-48. The court was careful to note the difference between the
preliminary injunction in this case and the stipulation of validity in Janssen. Id.
at 1348 ("Thus, unlike the generic drug company in Janssen which stipulated to
the validity, enforceability and infringement of an Orange Book patent, there
was no equivalent final judgment regarding the '841 patent.").
154 Id. at 1347. The court explained that, because the preliminary injunction
from the concurrent litigation dealing with the '841 patent would be lifted if
Teva prevailed in that case, only the listing of the remaining four patents in the
Orange Book prevented Teva's product launch. Id. at 1348. The court also
noted that, although the parties had agreed that the preliminary injunction would
remain in effect until the '841 patent expired on November 25, 2010, this did not
change its analysis because: (1) it did not affect jurisdiction at the beginning of
this appeal; and (2) the stipulation would only be relevant until the '841 patent
expired. Id. at 1348 n.4. The remaining four patents would still bar Teva from
obtaining FDA approval earlier, and the first-filer's 180-day exclusivity period
would run after the '841 patent's expiration date. Id.
"5s1d. at 1347-48.
156 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2991 (2011) (No. 10-1070).
15
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marketplace, triggering its 180-day exclusivity period.1 7 Consequently,
while the Federal Circuit's Teva decision cannot be cited with
authority, it may still serve as a useful guide for how the court
would decide future jurisdiction conflicts.
D. Dey v. Sunovion: The Possibility That the First ANDA Filer
Will Not Market Its Generic Drug Creates a "Case or
Controversy"
In Dey v. Sunovion,'" the Federal Circuit affirmed a district
court's conclusion that it had jurisdiction over a later ANDA filer's
declaratory judgment action.'" Sunovion Pharmaceuticals manufactured
the brand-name drug Xopenex (levalbuterol), which is used to treat
asthma and other lung problems.'60 The Orange Book listed three
patents as covering Xopenex: the '755, '994, and '289 patents. 6'
In June 2005, Breath Pharmaceuticals filed the first ANDA
application for Xopenex, which included Paragraph IV
certifications against all three of Sunovion's patents, thus entitling
Breath to a 180-day exclusivity period. 6 2 Sunovion sued Breath
for infringing all three patents, but they eventually entered into a
settlement agreement where Breath agreed not to launch its generic
version of Xopenex until August 2012, which was a little over six
months before the March 2013 expiry date of the '755 patent.' 3
Assuming Breath launched its generic version of Xopenex on time,
its 180-day exclusivity period would end at approximately the
same time the '755 patent expired.'"
'1 Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2991 (2011) (mem.)
(vacating and remanding the case to the Federal Circuit with instructions to
dismiss the case as moot).
15

677 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Dey Pharma, LP v. Sunovion Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1158, 1159 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
160 Id. at 1161; see XOPENEXHFA (2012), http://www.xopenex.com/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2013).
61
1 Dey, 677 F.3d at 1161.
1

162

id

163 Id.
'6 The '994 and '289 patents had expiry dates in August 2013 and March
2021, respectively. Id. Yet, for some reason, Sunovion agreed to allow Breath
to launch its generic product in August 2012, after the expiration of the '755
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In July 2005, Dey filed an ANDA with Paragraph IV
certifications against all three of the Orange Book-listed patents for
Xopenex."' Sunovion sued Dey for infringing the '755 and '994
patents but not the '289 patent, which would not expire until
March 2021.166 However, without a judgment of invalidity or noninfringement for the '289 patent, Breath's exclusivity period
blocked the FDA from approving Dey's later-filed ANDA. In
order to remove the roadblock caused by Breath's exclusivity
period, Dey needed to obtain a judgment of invalidity or noninfringement against all three Orange Book-listed patents, which
would cause Breath to forfeit the 180-day exclusivity period.
Thus, in an attempt to trigger forfeiture and obtain FDA approval,
Dey brought a declaratory judgment action against Sunovion.'16 7
Sunovion responded by granting Dey a unilateral covenant not to
sue on the '289 patent and moved to dismiss the declaratory
judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 16
However, the district court held that a covenant not to sue did not
eliminate the court's declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 169 In a
likely attempt to avoid having its patent invalidated, Sunovion
stipulated that Dey's generic product would not infringe the '289
patent, which the district court entered as a final judgment. '7
Sunovion then appealed, challenging the court's jurisdiction. 7'
Sunovion's first argument on appeal was that jurisdiction was
improper because a declaratory judgment would not redress Dey's
patent. Id. The reason for this strategy is not at all clear. It is possible that
Sunovion did not want to risk litigating the '994 and '289 patents because it did
not want to risk having a court find the patents invalid and/or non-infringed.
This strategy would ensure that these later-expiring patents would be available
to deter future generic challengers, or at least force them to launch at-risk.
Presumably, Breath must have threatened to litigate the '994 and '289 patents,
thus forcing Sunovion to use the earlier-expiring '755 patent as the basis for
a generic-entry date.
negotiating
16 5 Id.
166 id.
167 id.
168 id.
169
170

id

Id.

Id. at 1162.
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injury.12 Even if the action over the '289 patent was successful,
Dey still needed to succeed in the separate infringement litigation
over the '755 and '994 patents to enter the market. '7 Second,
Sunovion argued that the case was essentially moot because the
separate ligation over the '755 and '994 patents would not result in
a final judgment prior to August 2012, at which time Breath could
launch its generic product, triggering the 180-day exclusivity
period before it could be forfeited.'7 4
However, the Federal Circuit rejected both of Sunovion's
arguments and affirmed the district court's jurisdiction to hear the
declaratory judgment action. 1
In reaching its conclusion, the
court relied on its prior decision in Caraco, where the patent holder
also sued the later ANDA filer for infringing all but one of its
Orange Book-listed patents, and the later ANDA filer brought a
declaratory judgment action over the last-expiring Orange Book
patent because only a judgment of invalidity or infringement with
respect to all patents could trigger the first ANDA filer's
exclusivity period.'7 ' Like the later ANDA filer in Caraco, Dey
was being excluded from selling an allegedly non-infringing
product, an injury that was traceable to the patent holder and
redressable by a declaratory judgment that the last-expiring patent
was not infringed. 1n The court also noted that this case was
distinguishable from its prior decision in Janssen v. Apotex, where
the court held that the second ANDA filer failed to satisfy the caseor-controversy requirement because the later-filer had stipulated to
the validity of one of the Orange-Book-listed patents, and thus
success in the declaratory judgment action would still be

172

Id. at 1163.

173 Id. Recall that in order to trigger the failure-to-market forfeiture provision,
Dey would still need to succeed in showing that all three Orange Book-listed
patents were invalid or not infringed. See discussion supra Part II.B.
174 Dey, 677 F.3d at 1164. Furthermore, once Breath launched its drug, there
would no longer be a case or controversy because it would have triggered its
exclusivity period, enabling Dey and other generics to launch their generic drugs
after 180 days. Id.
17 id.
76

' Id. at 1163.

1n Id.
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insufficient to trigger a forfeiture event."' Consequently, the court
concluded in this case that simply eliminating Sunovion's '289
patent was sufficient for declaratory judgment jurisdiction because
litigation was pending that could eliminate the other barriers."I
As for Sunovion's second argument, the court concluded that
the possibility that Breath might launch its product before the
litigation was resolved was not sufficient to defeat jurisdiction.'
The court reasoned that a case or controversy persisted because
there was still a possibility that Breath would not market its drug,
which would prevent Dey, or other generics, from entering the
market until the '289 patent expired in 2021.8"' Sunovion argued
that the mere possibility that Breath might delay its generic launch
was not sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement.18 2
However, Sunovion conceded during oral arguments that the case
would not be rendered moot until Breath actually launched its
product. 18 Consequently, the court held that the district court
properly held jurisdiction over Dey's declaratory judgment action
and affirmed the lower court's judgment of non-infringement. 84

V.

APPLYING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RULINGS TO
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS

A. Overview of the Federal Circuit'sHoldings
As seen in the Federal Circuit decisions discussed above, a

later ANDA filer generally has standing to bring declaratory
judgment actions against the patent holder so long as the only thing
preventing the later-filer from entering the market is the first-filer's
For example, in Caraco, Teva, and
180-day exclusivity period.'
Dey the only bar to the later ANDA filer's entry into the
marketplace was the existence of a 180-day exclusivity period, so
178Id. at 1162-63.
79
1

Id. at 1164.
sold. at 1164--65.

181Id.

182

Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166.

184

id.
See supra Part IV.A-D.

185
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the court held that the later ANDA filer could bring a declaratory
judgment action in an attempt to trigger that 180-day period."'
However, once this 180-day exclusivity period has been triggered
by the first ANDA filer, a later ANDA filer can no longer satisfy
the case-or-controversy requirement because a declaratory
judgment action will not quicken the later ANDA filer's entry into
the market.'
Furthermore, if there are any blocking patents or
other barriers to market entry besides the first-filer's 180-day
exclusivity period, then the later ANDA filer will likely not have
standing.'" For example, in Janssen, the court reasoned that the
later ANDA filer was prevented from entering the marketplace
because the later-filer had already stipulated that one of the Orange
Book-listed patents was valid, which meant that triggering the firstfiler's 180-day exclusivity period would still not allow the laterfiler to enter the market before the expiration of the stipulated
patent. 1'
Thus, the ability of a later ANDA filer to bring
declaratory judgment actions against an Orange Book-listed patent
turns on whether or not the later ANDA filer would be barred from
entering the marketplace independent of the first-filer's 180-day
exclusivity period.
In the wake of the Federal Circuit's decisions in Caraco,
Janssen, and Teva, district courts have largely followed the above
analysis.'o The district court decisions discussed below confirm
that a later ANDA filer generally has jurisdiction to bring
See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2010), vacatedas moot, 131 S. Ct. 2991 (2011).
187 See Merck & Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 287 F. App'x 884, 888 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
188 See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1293; Janssen Pharm., N.V. v. Apotex,
Inc., 540
F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
89
Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1361.
190 With the exception of Dey and Apotex, discussed infra Part IV, most court
cases have settled on technicalities rather than on the merits of the cases. See,
e.g., Medeva Pharma Suisse A.G. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d 691, 69697 (D.N.J. 2011) (stating that the court would follow the rules set forth in
Caraco and Janssen, but dismissing the case because the first ANDA filer had
given up their 180-day exclusivity); Merck, 287 F. App'x at 888 (dismissing the
case as moot because the case was decided one week before the patents in
question expired).
186
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declaratory judgment actions against the patent holder so long as
the later ANDA filer has not independently prevented itself from
entering the market. In Seattle Children'sHospital v. Akorn,"' the
court held that the later ANDA filer could bring a declaratory
judgment action in attempt to trigger the 180-day exclusivity
period because the later-filer had not stipulated to the validity of
any Orange Book patents.' 92 In contrast, the later-filers in both
Apotex v. Eisai'" and Laboratories, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. '9' had

expressly recognized the validity of an Orange Book patent by
filing a Paragraph III certification or by filing a stipulation of
validity or infringement. 95 Thus, neither applicant had standing to
bring a declaratory judgment action.19 6
B. Seattle Children's Hospital v. Akom
In Seattle Children's Hospital v. Akorn, the district court held
that an actual controversy existed because a judgment would
remove the potential for an Orange Book-listed patent to exclude
the later-filer from the market. 97 Novartis Pharmaceuticals listed
the '269 patent in the Orange Book as covering Tobi (tobramycin
inhalation solution), an inhaled antibiotic for treating cystic
fibrosis symptoms.' 98 In 2009, Teva Pharmaceuticals filed the first
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification against the '269 patent to
market a generic version of the drug, and therefore was entitled to
a 180-day exclusivity period.199
Akom subsequently filed an ANDA with a Paragraph IV
certification for the '269 patent and notified Novartis in July
20 10.200 In response, Novartis sued Akom for infringement but
10-CV-5118, 2011 WL 6378838 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2011).
See id at *6.
93
1
No. 1:09CV477, 2010 WL 3420470 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2010).
194 No. 10-CV-06554, 2011 WL 4594824 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2011).
9 See Impax, 2011 WL 4594824, at *7; Apotex, 2010 WL 3420470, at *11.
96
1
See Impax, 2011 WL 4594824, at *7; Apotex, 2010 WL 3420470, at *11.
1 Seattle Children'sHosp., 2011 WL 6378838, at *6, *10.
198 Id. at *2; see also About TOBI, NOVARTIS PHARM. CORP., http://www.
tobitime.com/info/about-tobi/About-TOBI.jsp?usertrack.filter_
applied=true&Novald=4029462082237159967 (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
9 Akorn, 2011 WL 6378838, at *3 n.2.
'9'No.
192

200

id
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later granted Akorn a covenant not to sue on the '269 patent in
June 2011.201 Novartis then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the covenant not to sue mooted
the controversy between the parties.2 02 Because litigation was still
pending between Novartis and Teva, the 180-day exclusivity
period had not yet been triggered or forfeited, which prevented the
FDA from approving Akorn's ANDA. 203 Akom responded by
bringing a declaratory judgment action against Novartis seeking a
finding of invalidity or non-infringement against the '269 patent,
which, if successful, would cause Teva to forfeit its exclusivity
period.204
Following Caraco and Janssen, the court concluded that there
was an actual controversy notwithstanding the covenant not to sue
because Akom's alleged injury was fairly traceable to Novartis.20 5
While a successful declaratory judgment action would not directly
result in approval of Akorn's ANDA because the first-filer could
hypothetically begin commercialization early, the court reasoned
that this alone did not preclude jurisdiction.20 6 If Novartis had not
listed the '269 patent in the Orange Book, then FDA approval of
Akom's generic drug would not have been independently delayed
because Akom had not stipulated to the validity, infringement, or
enforceability of any patents. 207 Furthermore, a favorable judgment
would eliminate the potential for the '269 patent to exclude Akom
from the drug market. 208 Thus, the court held that there was a case
or controversy and granted Akom's motion to amend its answer to
include the declaratory judgment claim for non-infringement. 209

201

Id.

202 Id

at
Id. at
204 Id. at
205 Id. at
203

206

*3.
*3 n.2.
*3.
*6.

d

207

id
208
d
2 09

Id. at *10.
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C. Apotex v. Eisai
In Apotex v. Eisai, the district court followed the reasoning in
Janssen and held that a later ANDA filer did not have standing to
bring a declaratory judgment action when it failed to make
Paragraph IV certifications against all the pioneer's unexpired
Orange Book-listed patents.2 10 Eisai manufactures the brand-name
drug Aricept (donepezil hydrochloride), which is used to treat
symptoms of Alzheimer's disease.2 1 ' The Orange Book lists five
patents as covering Aricept: the '321, '760, '841, '864, and '911
patents.2 12 Both Ranbaxy and Teva filed ANDAs for Aricept and
shared the 180-day exclusivity period. Ranbaxy's ANDA, filed in
August 2003, included a Paragraph III certification for the '841
patent, which would expire in November 2010, and Paragraph IV
certifications for the remaining four patents. 2 13 Teva's ANDA,
filed in October 2005, included Paragraph IV certifications for all
five Orange Book-listed patents. 214 Because Teva was the first to
file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification challenging the
'841 patent, Teva was eligible to share Ranbaxy's 180-day
exclusivity period.2 15
210Apotex v. Eisai, No. 1:09CV477, 2010 WL 3420470, at *11 (M.D.N.C.

Aug. 27, 2010).
211 Id at
*3.
212 id
213 Id.
Eisai chose not to sue Ranbaxy for infringing its patents. Id.
Consequently, Ranbaxy would be able to enter market as soon as the '841 patent
expired in November 2010, which would trigger the start of its exclusivity
period. Id. However, in September 2008, the FDA sent Ranbaxy a warning
letter, alleging regulatory noncompliance, which could affect its FDA approval.
Id.
214 Id at *4. Teva's ANDA originally contained the same certifications as
Ranbaxy's ANDA, but Teva later amended its ANDA in October 2006 to
include Paragraph IV certifications against all five of Eisai's Orange Book-listed
patents. Id. Eisai sued Teva for infringing the '841 patent, but not the
remaining four patents. Id. At the time of the litigation between Eisai and
Apotex, the suit between Eisai and Teva was still pending, but Eisai had been
awarded a preliminary injunction that prevented Teva from marketing its generic
until the '841 patent expired in November 2010. Id.
215 Id. Note that before the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, exclusivity
was granted on a patent-by-patent basis, such that later ANDA filers could share
exclusivity if they were the first to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV
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In July 2007, Apotex filed an ANDA with a Paragraph III
certification against the '841 patent and Paragraph IV certifications
against the remaining four patents. 2 6 Rather than suing Apotex,
Eisai unilaterally granted Apotex a covenant not to sue with
respect to the '760 and '911 patents and filed statutory disclaimers
with respect to the '321 and '864 patents.217 Apotex, however, was
still blocked from entering the market by Ranbaxy and Teva's
exclusivity periods. 218 Thus, in an attempt to cause Ranbaxy and
Teva to forfeit the exclusivity period, Apotex filed a declaratory
judgment action in July 2009 asserting that it did not infringe the
'321, '760, '864, and '911 patents. 2 19
Because Apotex expressly recognized the validity of the '841
patent by filing a Paragraph III certification, the court held that the
Paragraph III certification was analogous. to the stipulation of
validity in Janssen.2 20 As a result, even if Apotex were to prevail
in their declaratory judgment action, it would still be prevented
from entering the marketplace until after the '841 patent expired.2 21
Therefore, the court held that Apotex failed to satisfy the Article
III case-or-controversy requirement and lacked standing to bring
the declaratory judgment action.222

certification for a particular Orange Book-listed patent. However, the MMA
amended the Hatch-Waxman Act so that exclusivity is now granted on a drugby-drug (or NDA-by-NDA) basis, such that the first ANDA filer with a
Paragraph IV certification against any Orange Book-listed patent now receives
the 180-day exclusivity period. Shared exclusivity will only happen if multiple
generics file ANDAs on the same day. See Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat.
2066 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of21 and 42 U.S.C.).
216 Apotex, 2010 WL 3420470, at
*4.
217
Id. The statutory disclaimers for the '321 and '864 patents were filed in
2006 and 2007, respectively, prior to the filing of Apotex's ANDA. Id.
218 Id. at *7.
219 Id. at *4.
22o ld. at *10. The court stated that the filing of a Paragraph III certification in
effect recognizes the validity and enforceability of the patent. Id. at *11 n.4.
221 Id. at *11. This case essentially came to the same conclusion
as Janssen,
the
180-day
exclusivity
a
later
ANDA
filer
to
have
standing,
holding that for
period must be the only bar to entering the marketplace.
222

Id.
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D. Impax Laboratories v. Pfizer
In Impax Laboratories,Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.,223 the district court
held, similarly to Apotex v. Eisai, that a later ANDA filer failed to
satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement because the later
ANDA filer had stipulated to be bound by a final court decision of
patent invalidity or non-infringement.22 4 Pfizer manufactures the
drug Detrol LA (tolerodine tartrate extended-release capsules),
which is used to treat symptoms related to an overactive bladder.225
In the Orange Book, Pfizer listed four patents as covering Detrol
LA: the '600, '162, '295, and '217 patent.226 Teva filed the first
ANDA application with Paragraph IV certifications against all four
of Pfizer's patents and became eligible for a 180-day exclusivity
period.227 Pfizer sued Teva for infringing only the '600 patent, and
this litigation was still pending when the Impax case arose.228
In December 2007, Impax filed an ANDA with Paragraph IV
certifications against all four of Pfizer's Orange Book patents.2 29
Pfizer sued Impax for infringing three of its patents, but not the
fourth patent-the '217 patent. 230 The lawsuit was consolidated
with the Pfizer's infringement suit against Teva, and all parties
agreed and stipulated to be bound by a final judgment regarding
the validity or non-infringement of the '600 patent. 231' However,
the FDA could not approve Impax's ANDA unless Teva's
exclusivity period ran or was forfeited. To cause Teva to forfeit its
No. 10-CV-06554, 2011 WL 4594824.
Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 10-CV-06554, 2011 WL
4594824, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of
declaratory judgment jurisdiction); see also Kurt R. Karst, New Jersey District
Court Says ANDA Approval Delay and Patent Uncertainty Are Insufficient to
Support DJ Jurisdiction in Generic DETROL LA Litigation, FDA LAW BLOG
(Nov. 10, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda-law bloghyman
phelps/20 11/1 1/new-jersey-district-court-says-anda-approval-delay-and-patentuncertainty-are-insufficient-to-suppor.html.
225 Impax, 2011 WL 4594824, at *2.
223

224

226

Id

227 id.

Id. at *3.
Id at *2.
23o Id. at *3.
228
229

231

Id
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exclusivity period, Impax needed a court judgment that all four of
Pfizer's patents were invalid or not infringed. Thus, Impax filed
an action against Pfizer in December 2010, seeking a declaration
that it did not infringe the '217 patent.2 32 In response, Pfizer
granted Impax a covenant not to sue with respect to the '217 patent
and filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.23 3
The court granted Pfizer's motion to dismiss because here, like
in Janssen, Impax had stipulated to be bound by any decision
regarding the validity or non-infringement of the '600 patent.234
Although Impax claimed that it was injured because it could not
promptly launch its generic drug and was subject to patent
uncertainty absent a declaratory judgment, the court held that these
injuries were not directly traceable to the '217 patent or redressable
by the declaratory judgment action because a final judgment
finding that the '600 patent was valid had been entered.23 5 Thus,
the court held that Impax had not presented an Article III case or
controversy. 23 6
VI. STRATEGIES FOR PATENT HOLDERS AND LATER ANDA
FILERS

The Federal Circuit and district court opinions discussed above
show that later ANDA filers can bring declaratory judgment
actions to trigger the first ANDA filer's 180-day exclusivity period
and quicken market entry of their drugs. However, it is not always
clear when declaratory judgment jurisdiction is available. The
following discusses strategies that both patent holders and later
ANDA filers should consider before bringing suit.
A. ANDAs with Both Paragraph III and Paragraph IV
Certifications
An ANDA application must include a certification for each
232
233

234

id
id

Id. at *7.
Id. at *5.
236 Id. at *7.
235
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OrangeBook-listed patent covering that drug the applicant seeks to
copy.2 37 An applicant can either make a Paragraph III certification,
stating that their generic drug will not enter the market until the
patent expires, or a Paragraph IV certification, stating that the
patent is invalid or will not be infringed by their generic drug.238
If an ANDA application from a later-filer includes any
Paragraph III certifications, this will likely preclude them from
bringing a declaratory judgment action against a patent holder to
trigger a first ANDA filer's 180-day exclusivity period. The
Federal Circuit's holdings make it clear that a later ANDA filer
will likely not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action
if there are any blocking patents or other barriers to market entry.
In the case where a later-filer is making a Paragraph III
certification stating that they will not enter the market until a
particular patent expires, that patent will likely be considered a
blocking patent that defeats declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
For example, in Apotex v. Eisai, a later ANDA applicant filed
Paragraph IV certifications for all but one patent listed in the
Orange Book and a Paragraph III certification for the remaining
patent.239 The district court held that the later ANDA filer could
not bring a declaratory judgment action against the patent holder
because the Paragraph III certification was analogous to the
stipulation of validity in Janssen.240 Later ANDA filers who
anticipate filing a declaratory judgment action in the future should
file Paragraph IV certifications to all of the Orange Book patents
that cover a given drug.
If, for some reason, the later-filer wishes to file an ANDA
containing a Paragraph III certification, the applicant should ensure
that any patent it makes such a certification against has an
expiration date that precedes the earliest generic entry date of the

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (2012); see also supra Part I.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II)-(lV).
239 Apotex, Inc. v. Eisai, Inc., No. 1:09CV477, 2010 WL 3420470, at *9
(M.D.N.C.
Aug. 27, 2010).
240
Id. The court stated that the filing of a Paragraph III certification in effect
recognizes the validity and enforceability of the patent. Id. at *11 n.4.
237
238
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first-filer.241 This means that, in general, later-filers should only
make Paragraph III certifications against the earliest expiring
Orange Book-listed patents covering a particular drug. Any
Paragraph III patent having an expiration date after the first-filer's
expected generic entry date will act as a blocking patent for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction purposes.
For example, suppose the NDA-holder listed two patents in the
Orange Book, and the first-filer has entered into a reverse-payment
settlement with the NDA-holder where it agrees not to enter the
market until both patents expire. This means later-filers will not be
able to enter the market until at least six months after the patents
expire and the first-filer has expended its 180-day exclusivity
period. If the later ANDA filer makes a Paragraph III certification
against the later-expiring patent and a Paragraph IV certification
against the earlier-expiring patent, then the later ANDA filer will
not be able to market its drug until the later date, even if it obtains
a judgment that the earlier-expiring patent is invalid or not
infringed. In this case, the later-expiring patent will act as a
blocking patent and defeat declaratory judgment jurisdiction, as in
Janssen.242 However, if the later ANDA filer makes a Paragraph
III certification against the earlier-expiring patent and a Paragraph
IV certification against the later-expiring patent, then the applicant
would theoretically be able to enter the market on the earlier date,
assuming that it can cause the first-filer to forfeit its 180-day
exclusivity period. Thus, filing a Paragraph III certification
against the earlier-expiring patent prevents it from being used as a
blocking patent that would defeat declaratory judgment
jurisdiction.
Likewise, a patent holder will want to avoid litigating its laterexpiring patents and instead assert its earlier-expiring patents.
Even if the earliest expiring patent is held invalid or not infringed,
any later-expiring patents will still be available to deter generic

241 Or before the anticipated entry date of the 180-day-exclusivity-period
holder if that is not the first-filer.
242 Janssen Pharm., N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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challengers, forcing the generic challengers to either bring a
declaratory judgment action or launch at risk.2 43
B. Asserting Fewer than All Patents in Response to a Paragraph
IV ANDA
When a later-filed ANDA application includes Paragraph IV
certifications against all of the unexpired Orange Book-listed
patents covering a drug, the patent holder has the option of suing
the generic challenger for infringing all, some, or even none of the
listed patents. While the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the patentee.
the right to sue the generic challenger in response to a Paragraph
IV ANDA, patentees often choose not to sue later-filers in order to
avoid litigating a particular patent. Because the failure-to-market
forfeiture provision requires a finding of invalidity or noninfringement with respect to all patents with Paragraph IV
certifications by the first ANDA filer, all the pioneer needs to do to
prevent this forfeiture event from occurring is to keep at least one
patent out of litigation.
Failing to sue a later ANDA filer for infringing an Orange
Book-listed patent, however, is not sufficient to defeat declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. The patent holder may be able to delay final
resolution of all its patents by not asserting some of them, but it
cannot stop the generic challenger from seeking a final resolution
by doing so. At best, the patent holder can force the ANDA filer to
litigate the unasserted patents in a separate declaratory judgment
action. The Federal Circuit's decisions in Dey and Caracomake it
clear that a generic challenger can bring a declaratory judgment
action against these unasserted patents as long as there is a way for
the generic challenger to obtain a finding of invalidity or noninfringement for all the remaining OrangeBook-listed patents. For
example, in Dey, the Federal Circuit held that even though the later
ANDA applicant still needed to succeed in the separate
Marketing a generic drug while related Paragraph IV litigation is pending
"at-risk" because the generic challenger risks liability for the
considered
is
pioneer's lost profits if the generic loses the patent case. See Yana Pechersky,
Note, To Achieve Closure of the Hatch-Waxman Act's Loopholes, Legislative
Action Is Unnecessary: Generic ManufacturersAre Able to Hold Their Own, 25
243

CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 796 (2007).
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infringement litigation over two other Orange Book-listed patents
to enter the market, the later ANDA filer could file declaratory
action to eliminate an unasserted patent because litigation was
pending that could eliminate the other patents. 2" Thus, absent
other factors, declaratory judgment jurisdiction is not precluded
merely because the patent holder has chosen not to assert all of its
patents. But if the NDA holder can get at least one blocking
patent-i.e., a patent that cannot be challenged for some reasonthen later-filers will be precluded from bring declaratory judgment
actions against any unasserted patents.
C. UnilateralCovenants Not to Sue
After the Supreme Court reaffirmed the "all circumstances
test" in MedImmune, patent holders began granting unilateral
covenants not to sue on unasserted patents listed in the Orange
Book in an attempt to eliminate any possible case or controversy.
However, the Federal Circuit's precedent makes it clear that a
unilateral covenant not to sue will not defeat declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. For example, in Caraco, the Federal Circuit held that
a covenant not to sue did not eliminate the controversy between the
parties because the patent holder's mere listing of patents in the
Orange Book prevented the later ANDA filer from entering the
marketplace, which created an injury-in-fact that was redressable
by a declaratory judgment.245 Thus, patent holders should be aware
that a unilateral covenant not to sue alone is not sufficient to defeat
a later-filer's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action.
However, if there is at least one blocking patent, a unilateral
covenant not to sue from the patent holder should always be
sufficient to terminate a declaratory judgment action by a later
ANDA filer. Interestingly, outside of the Hatch-Waxman context
a unilateral covenant not to sue will almost always be sufficient to
moot a patent infringement case, including declaratory judgment
actions, so long as the covenant covers past, present, and future
Pharma, LP v. Sunovion Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
245 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs.,
Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1292 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
244Dey
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actions.24 6 Such a covenant will generally eliminate any actual
injury, and thus eliminate any case or controversy necessary to
establish Article III standing. 247 Furthermore, in a recent trademark
case, the Supreme Court held that a covenant not to sue granted by
the trademark holder was sufficient to moot a counterclaim
challenging the validity of its trademark. 248 As discussed above,
the reason that a covenant not to sue alone is not sufficient to
defeat declaratory judgment jurisdiction for generic challengers is
because, under Hatch-Waxman's complex statutory scheme, the
mere existence of the patent may cause harm to the generic
because its listing in the Orange Book can prevent the challenger
from entering the market. But if the later generic challenger
cannot enter the market even if it prevails in the declaratory
judgment action, then a covenant not to sue should defeat the
action for the same reasons as it would outside of the HatchWaxman context.
VII. FIXING THE ROADBLOCK TO GENERIC DRUGS

The inability of generic drug manufacturers to bring
declaratory judgment actions has led to situations where the first
ANDA filer's 180-day exclusivity period keeps generic drugs off
the market indefinitely. To solve these problems, this Article
proposes the following solutions.
A. Expanding DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdiction
Patent holders have used a variety of controversial means to
effectively extend their patent-granted monopoly. 249 By entering
into reverse-payment settlements with the first ANDA filer, patent
holders have been able to block other generic companies from
entering the market using the first ANDA filer's exclusivity
See, e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
247 See
id.
248 See Already LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2013) (finding
that
Already's counterclaim challenging the validity of Nike's trademark was
mooted after Nike withdrew its claim of trademark infringement with prejudice
and granted a covenant not to sue to Already).
249 See Avery, supra note 15, at 192-93.
246
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period.25 0 One of the only ways for a later-filer to overcome such a
roadblock is by bringing a declaratory judgment action against the
patent holder, but whether courts have jurisdiction to hear
declaratory judgment actions brought by later ANDA filers is still
not clear. The current regulatory regime should be modified to
resolve problems with declaratory judgment jurisdiction by
expressly granting jurisdiction to later ANDA filers.
The Federal Circuit has already indicated that later ANDA
applicants may bring declaratory judgment actions against patent
holders to trigger a first ANDA filer's exclusivity period.
Furthermore, Congress has stated:
In ... these . .. circumstances, generic applicants must be able to seek
a resolution of disputes involving all patents listed in the Orange Book
with respect to the drug immediately upon the expiration of the 45-day
period. We believe there can be a case or controversy sufficient for
courts to hear these cases merely because the patents at issue have been
listed in the FDA Orange Book, and because the statutory scheme of
the Hatch-Waxman Act relies on early resolution of patent disputes.
The declaratory judgment provisions in this bill are intended to
encourage such early resolution of patent disputes. 2 51

Yet, later ANDA filers have been precluded from bringing
declaratory judgments in certain contexts. Congress could clear
the path for later ANDA filers to bring declaratory judgment
actions by changing the Hatch-Waxman Act to expressly grant
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to later ANDA filers. By
encouraging early resolution of these patent disputes, generic
manufacturers will be able to bring their drugs to the market
sooner.
B. Reforming the 180-day Exclusivity Period
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, only the first ANDA applicant
to file a Paragraph IV certification for a particular drug is eligible
for the 180-day exclusivity period. 252 The purpose of the
exclusivity period is to encourage generic manufacturers to
250 See id.

149 CONG. REC. S15885 (Nov. 25, 2003) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy,
ranking member of U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions).
252 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)
(2012).
251
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challenge a brand-name drug company's patents, but many firstfilers enter into reverse payment settlements, retaining the 180-day
exclusivity period and blocking their competitors from entering the
market.253
This problem of penalizing later-filers could be fixed by
creating "rolling exclusivity."25 4 The Hatch-Waxman Act should
be revised so that if the first Paragraph IV challenger settles and
does not enter the market, the 180-day exclusivity would instead
be granted to the next challenger. 255 Granting the exclusivity
period to the first successful generic challenger would eliminate
the roadblock to generic entry and deter reverse payment
settlements because it would be less feasible for the patent holder
to enter such settlements with multiple generic challengers. 256
Awarding the exclusivity period only to the first generic
manufacturer to succeed at trial aligns with the purpose of the
exclusivity period, which is to encourage generic drug
manufacturers to challenge weak patents. It also increases the
chances that generic companies will introduce low-cost drugs to
Additionally, implementing a rolling
the market earlier.
exclusivity award has the potential to protect pharmaceutical patent
holders from frivolous lawsuits by generic manufacturers who are
merely hoping for a quick settlement, and encourages generic
manufacturers to bring suit only when they have relatively strong
claims.
253 See id.

Avery, supra note 15, at 194.
See Ashlee B. Mehl, Note, The Hatch- Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity
for Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81
CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 649, 674 (2006); cf C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley,
Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 986 (2011) (proposing the first-entry exclusivity where
Congress grants exclusivity not to the first ANDA filer, but to the first generic to
successfully enter the market). Note that if the first-filer proceeds to trial and
loses, it must amend its Paragraph IV certification to a Paragraph III
See
event.
forfeiture
trigger
a
may
which
certification,
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(1ll) (stating that the first ANDA filer forfeits its
exclusivity period if it "amends or withdraws the certification for all of the
patents with respect to which that applicant submitted a certification qualifying
the applicant for the 180-day exclusivity period").
256 See Avery, supra note 15, at
194.
254

255
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C. Expediting Orange Book PatentDelistings
A generic manufacturer that is sued for patent infringement in
response to a Paragraph IV ANDA filing may bring a counterclaim
to delist the patent from the Orange Book.257 If the pioneer's patent
is found either to not cover the listed drug or to cover only an
invalid method of using the listed drug, the pioneer can be forced
to withdraw the patent listing from the Orange Book, allowing the
generic challenger to amend its application to a Paragraph I
certification and thereby avoid litigation. Additionally, delisting a
patent from the Orange Book is a forfeiture event, which would
force a first-filing applicant with an approved ANDA to enter the
market within seventy-five days in order to avoid forfeiting its
exclusivity period.25 8
Currently, ANDA filers have the right to assert a delisting
counterclaim if the patentee has already sued the ANDA filer for
infringement. 259 This right should be expanded so that generic
challengers can bring declaratory judgment actions to force NDA
holders to delist improperly listed patents from the Orange Book.
In cases where the patentee has chosen not to assert its patents or
disclaimed them, there would arguably be no harm to the patentee
and the public would greatly benefit because it would allow lowcost generic drugs to reach the market sooner.260 In cases where
there are other patents and there is an actual dispute between the

See 21

U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)

("If an owner of the patent .. . brings a
patent infringement action against the [ANDA] applicant, the applicant may
assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the holder to correct or delete
the patent information submitted by the holder ... on the ground that the patent
does not claim either - (aa) the drug for which the application was approved; or
(bb) an approved method of using the drug."). Note that this is not an
independent cause of action and can only be raised as a counterclaim.
258 See id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC) (stating that the exclusivity period is
forfeited 75 days after "[t]he patent information submitted under subsection (b)
or (c) is withdrawn by the [ANDA] holder").
257

See id.
260 A patentee may file a statutory disclaimer with the USPTO to relinquish
259

some or all of the rights associated with a particular patent. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.321 (2013) ("A patentee owning the whole or any sectional interest in a
patent may disclaim any complete claim or claims in a patent.").
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parties, it would help facilitate the early resolution of patent
disputes between generic and brand-name drug manufacturers.
Alternatively, patent holders should be required to remove
unasserted or disclaimed patents from the Orange Book. Because
the FDA serves only a ministerial role when listing patents in the
Orange Book, the FDA will only delist patents if the patent holder
requests that it do so. 26 ' As a result, unasserted or disclaimed
patents can block generic drugs from reaching the market even
though those patents cannot be enforced. For example, in Teva v.
Eisai the Federal Circuit noted that because Eisai's disclaimed
patents still were listed in the Orange Book, FDA approval of
Teva's ANDA was delayed until the first-filer's exclusivity period
expired.26 2 Requiring removal of unasserted or disclaimed patents
from the OrangeBook would avoid such situations. Patent holders
are arguably not harmed because they have either chosen not to
exercise their rights or have already forfeited them, and generic
manufacturers would be able to enter the market more quickly.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Later-filing ANDA applicants are almost always blocked from
entering the market by the exclusivity period of the first-filers who
often delay their own market entry because of reverse payment
settlements with the brand-name drug manufacturers. One of the
only ways for a later-filer to enter the market is by bringing a
declaratory judgment action against the brand-name company.
Determining when these later-filers have jurisdiction to bring such
actions, however, is complicated. The Federal Circuit's decisions
indicate that a later-filer will generally have standing to bring a
declaratory judgment action against the brand-name company so
long as the later-filer is not otherwise prevented from entering the
marketplace. If the later-filer has made Paragraph IV certifications
against all unexpired Orange Book-listed patents covering a drug,
then the later-filer should be able to bring a declaratory judgment
See aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2002);
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f (2011).
262 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1348 n.3 (Fed.
Cir.
2010), vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2991 (2011).
261
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action. However, if there are any blocking patents, such as those
covered by stipulations of validity or Paragraph III certifications,
then declaratory judgment jurisdiction can likely be defeated.
In order to prevent the first-filer's exclusivity period from
being used as a roadblock to generic drugs, Congress should
expressly grant declaratory judgment jurisdiction to later
challengers or, alternatively, reform the Hatch-Waxman Act so that
the exclusivity period rolls over to the first successful generic
challenger.
Furthermore, Congress should allow generic
challengers to bring declaratory judgment actions to delist
improperly listed patents from the Orange Book, which would
cause forfeiture of the exclusivity period and allow later generic
challengers to enter the market. All of these solutions would
further Hatch-Waxman's goal of facilitating the market entry of
generic drugs, while still preserving the rights of pharmaceutical
patent holders.
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